Modern culture has not really rendered creeds and confessions untrue; far less has it rendered them unbiblical. But it has rendered them implausible and distasteful. They are implausible because they are built on old-fashioned notions of truth and language. They make the claim that a linguistic formulation of a state of affairs can have a binding authority beyond the mere text on the page that creeds actually refer to something and that that something has significance for all of humanity. 
The creedal and confessional imperative
The Apostle Paul calls us to believe with one's heart and to confess what one believes (Rom 10:9). This is a twofold Christian imperative -the creedal and confessional imperative -that is at the root of creeds and confessions of faith.
2 Faith involves both the fides qua creditor -the faith with which one believes -and the fides quae creditur -the faith which one believes. 3 Maximally, a biblical account of faith involves knowledge (notitia), assent (assensus), and trust (fiducia); indeed, these are three elements of a single 102 Echeverria • STJ 2015, Vol 1, No 1, 99-123 An example of a theologian who seems to slouch toward doctrinal relativism is found in a recent article of South African theologian, Dirkie Smit, in his description of the characteristic reformed convictions regarding confessions.
11 Briefly, these convictions are, first, that the confessions of the Reformed tradition have relative authority, meaning thereby that "they carry no authority in and from themselves," and hence their authority is derivative, being ultimately subject to the ultimate authority of God's Word. Second, these documents are "historical and contextual by nature." Having this nature requires, says Smit, that responsible interpretation show "respect for their historical context and social and cultural background, sensitivity for the grammatical and conceptual instrumentation, careful insights into the specific controversies in which and the positions again which they were written in the first place," and so forth. These first two points are, arguably, important aspects of confessions from both a Reformed and Catholic perspective.
But the remainder of what Smit says regarding confessions sets up an opposition between historical conditioning and permanent truth, and this opposition is problematic. A corollary of the historical and contextual nature of confessions, Smit concludes, is that therefore "they are not a-historical documents with timeless and eternal propositions." Why this opposition between history and permanent truth? Smit implies here that the truth of p depends upon when it was uttered or asserted in a particular confession. Of course he is right that, say, the Heidelberg Catechism is a historical document that was written in an original historical setting. These matters are undeniable. The question is, however, whether the theological truth-content of what is asserted in the Catechism is exclusively tied to that setting. For instance, Question and Answer 1 of Lord's Day 1 asserts truth about Jesus Christ that is indifferent to time, and hence one may that such truth is timeless because the same truth is stated when asserted time and again. 
Q.
What is your only comfort in life and in death? A. That I am not my own, but belong -body and soul, in life and in death -to my faithful Saviour, Jesus Christ. He has fully paid for all my sins with his precious blood, and has set me free from the tyranny of the devil. He also watches over me in such a way that not a hair can fall from my head without the will of my Father in heaven; in fact, all things must work together for my salvation.
Because I belong to him, Christ, by his Holy Spirit, assures me of eternal life and makes me wholeheartedly willing and ready from now on to live for him.
12
Surely the truth of the statements asserted in this passage does not depend on when they were uttered or asserted. Thus, one should say "it is equally true for men and women living at any time, and in any place."
13
In the past, according to Smit, thinking of the confessions as creedal statements asserting p has led to embracing the idea that "truth is the accuracy of propositions. Smit also cautions us against a propositional view of truth because then, he claims, "faith becomes [1] intellectual obedience to authoritative documents." In addition, he claims that this view of truth leads us to think, "the knowledge of faith becomes [2] intellectual information about historical facts and [3] correct formulations." Rather than examine each of these points, let me put my response to Smit as follows. Although authentic Christian faith isn't merely "intellectual obedience to authoritative documents," given its creedal and confessional expressions, faith surely involves the assent of the mind to the communication of truths about objective reality in these documents. Furthermore, authentic Christian faith surely involves affirming the fundamental significance of history for faith. For instance, the truth of what the Heidelberg Catechism asserts about how the resurrection of Christ benefits us presupposes that the resurrection actually happened in space and time. 15 Regarding the truth status of dogmatic formulations, I think essentialism is correct. Characteristic of essentialism is the claim that there is a "dogmatic conceptual hard-core" 16 of Catholic dogmas, such as the Trinity and the Incarnation, whose meaning does not change precisely because it is true to reality. The content of the concepts informing the propositions that God is Triune, and that the Second Person of the Trinity is God Incarnate, is meaning invariant, is fixed and hence determinate. Essentialism as such is, however, not incompatible with the claim, as Thomas Guarino notes, "that every statement requires further thought and elucidation, that every assertion is open to reconceptualization and reformulation, and that no statement comprehensively exhausts truth, much less divine truth."
17 But the linguistic formulation or expression can vary, as long as they mediate the same judgment. Pace Smit, there is no reason to think that the acceptance of truth as propositional leads to absolutising "correct formulations." 139n59; see also, 100n20. I have learned much from Fr. Guarino's magisterial study.
Crisp also argues that essentialism is compatible with the view "that our understanding of the concept might develop, becoming conceptually richer, being developed along the lines of a particular model of the Trinity, and so on" ("Ad Hector," 138).
Third, Smit holds that the "Reformed confessions are the products of fallible human activity, which implies that they may need correction, revision, and even replacement." 18 Of course they are fallible human achievements, but there still remains to ask the question as to which aspects of the confessions need correction, revision, and even replacement. Do Articles 8-9 of the Belgic Confession of Faith on the Trinity and the Incarnation require correction? Is the theological truth-content of either one or the other of these articles false? Do they require revision, and hence replacement? To deny any that they need correction; revision or replacement does not mean that Articles 8-9 exhaustively express the truth. These truths may be open to reconceptualization and reformulation. This openness is not incompatible with propositionalism. Now, Smit holds that the creeds and confessions do not contain "timeless and acontextual systems of propositional truth."
19 So, is Smit saying that the creeds, the ecumenical creeds of historic Christianity, and the confessions, say, the Three Forms of Unity of the Reformed Tradition -the Canons of Dort, the Belgic Confession of Faith, and the Heidelberg Catechism -do not contain permanently true statements, the same truths that are equally true for all people at any time and place, down through the ages? If so, I can only conclude that he espouses the view of unqualified fallibilism 20 -linguistically articulated dogmas, and the understanding of truth expressed by these propositions, are always in principle reversible and capable of being otherwise. Fallibilism is "the conviction that knowledge claims are always open to further rational criticism and revision. Fallibilism does not challenge the claim that we can know the truth, but rather the belief that we can know that we have attained the final truth with absolute certainty." Smit's apparent rejection, in his second point, of propositional truth is troublesome not only because it will leave us unable to explain the material identity of Christian truth over time, but also because "God's revelation … includes propositions as an essential element, and Christian faith in God includes assent to them." 22 I shall return to these points in the next section. Regarding relativism, I think we can say that he nowhere proposes a relativistic view of truth. Rather, arguably, it is more the trajectory of his thought that moves in that direction. In particular, I will now argue that there is a tension in Smit's view of the nature of confessional truth. On the one hand, he says that what the authors of these documents confess is not mere opinion, whether personal opinion or the perspective of an ecclesial community. "Reformed piety," he urges, "is not concerned only with its own opinions, or seeing these historical and contextual documents as the perspective of those involved." Without pausing to reflect on the epistemic status of the claims of these confessions, however, he continues by saying that their authors, even given their awareness of "their own human limitations and perspectives, they still claim to confess the gospel, the truth of the gospel and the biblical message, for their own particular context." 23 This is "catholic" truth, "ecumenical" truth, adds Smit, and hence that biblical truth which is confessed is not just true for the Reformed tradition. So far so good.
But if they are not "mere opinion," as Smit claims, that can only be because they are exclusive beliefs, propositional truths; the latter are such that because they assert truth, excluding some things as false, those who deny the truth of these propositions must be regarded as mistaken. Given Smit's rejection of propositional truth, however, it isn't obvious that he can justify his claim that these confessions are not mere opinion.
Furthermore, we must ask here, what is the nature of truth, according to Smit? Given his emphasis on the historical and contextual nature of these documents, and his apparent rejection of propositional truth and all that this rejection entails (see above), is the truth of the central affirmations of those confessions affected in any way by the context in which they were asserted? Yes, of course, as Smit rightly notes, since they are historical documents written in light of a specific controversy, they are polemical and antithetical, and hence as such all truth formulated for polemical reasons is partial -albeit true. I shall return to the importance of this point below. For now, let me stress that however incompletely and inadequately creeds and confessions may express the truth of revelation, and however important understanding the extra-linguistic context is for understanding the asserted propositions understood within that context, they are nevertheless true insofar as they state absolutely nothing that is false. Pace Smit, must we not say of the truth-content of such assertions that if true, always true, permanently true, unalterably true, and hence in that sense "acontextually" true? In other words, historical conditioning and permanent truth are not incompatible.
For Smit, It would seem not since he denies, on the other hand, that there are "infallible doctrines," "final interpretations of the Bible," that is, permanently true judgments expressing the central creedal affirmations of the Christian faith that are determinative, unquestionable, and yes, infallible, meaning thereby that they are irreversible. There are, he says, only "open, declarative affirmations of what these churches believe to be the truth claims of this message and of how they currently understand themselves to be bound by the church's earliest confession that Jesus Christ is Lord."
24 What does Smith mean by open here?
He doesn't say, but I think we can surmise that given his apparent rejection of permanently true judgments that are determinative of the faith, it would seem that he endorses an unqualified fallibilism. An unqualified fallibilism thinks that linguistically articulated doctrines are always open to what Thomas Guarino calls "fallibilistic reversibility." In other words, every proposition seems open to denial. But is reversibility possible, for instance, with respect to the creedal statement that "Jesus Christ is Lord?" How could it be? Guarino rightly answers: "Fallibilistic 'reversibility' is not possible here because the denial of Jesus Christ as the incarnate Word of God is not admissible." This dogmatic truth is determinative for faith. Smit's thought is driven to unqualified fallibilism because he rejects propositional truth and thus lacks the ability to distinguish between propositions and sentences, truth-content and context, in short, truth and its formulations. Given the distinction between truth and its formulations, and its corollary that truths of faith are more than their linguistic expression, a qualified fallibilism, by contrast, can hold on to a dogmatic truth's unchangeableness and still give an account of the need for new expressions. As Guarino explains, "a qualified fallibilism is always endorsable if one means by this that every statement requires further thought and elucidation, that every assertion is open to reconceptualization and reformulation, and that no statement comprehensively exhausts truth, much less divine truth." 25 Furthermore, a qualified fallibilism can express truth determinatively in theological formulations and not as a mere approximation of the truth. Again, Smit's rejection of propositional truth and hence propositional revelation leads us to ask him whether nothing that is affirmed in those confessions is permanent, irrevocable, irreformable, and unchangeable truth, no not even the assertion "Jesus Christ is Lord" (Phil 2:11)?
Why can't these confessional documents be "historical and contextual by nature" and at the same time make assertions that if true, always true, such as Jesus was born of the Virgin Mary, Jesus suffered, died, and was buried? If these assertions, as Colin Gunton correctly notes, "were once true, they are always true." 26 In other words, these statements never stopped being true, even after Jesus stopped suffering, and so on, and hence are now forever true. Consider, for example, the assertion expressing the proposition, Jesus came into the world to save sinners (1 Tim 1:15). Yes, we are focusing here on propositional truth, on the truth of what St. Paul asserted, the theological truth-content, rather than on the fact that he asserted it in a particular context, and so forth. Indeed, this is the case "even though we may need to explain, gloss and expand them in all kinds of ways." 27 In other words the claim that once something is true it is always true, forever true, and unchangeably true, is not inconsistent with finding new ways of expressing the truth of dogmas when the need arises. Smit rightly sees the need for new expressions when it is necessary "to confess this same faith if possible clearer than before and to articulate possible misunderstandings, confusion and mistaken opinions more accurately than before."
28 But Smit's rejection of propositional truth and hence of propositional revelation leaves unclear the determinate truth-content of the Christian faith and hence leaves unclear how he would explain the material identify of Christian truth over time. That leaves unanswered the question of the nature of the continuity of the same faith -it is just the idem sensus, the same meaning, which must be protected from age to age -and hence his position leaves the creeds, confessions, dogmas of faith, indeed, Christian orthodoxy defenceless against relativism. This is a troubling implication of Smit's view because, as Pelikan rightly sees, "underlying the creedal and conciliar definitions of orthodoxy from the beginning have been three shared presuppositions: first, that there is a straight line . . . from the Gospels to the creed; consequently, second, that the true doctrine being confessed by the councils and creeds of the church is identical with what the New Testament calls the 'faith which was once for all delivered to the saints' [Jude 3]; and therefore, third, that continuity with that faith is the essence of orthodoxy, and discontinuity with it the essence of heresy."
29 Although Pelikan does not develop the points he rightly makes here with respect to the question of the nature of continuity that binds together the revealed Word of God to the true doctrines asserted by the creeds and confessions and hence to the essence of orthodoxy, that question has to be faced. But not here. 30 Here, I will simply presuppose the traditional notions of truth and language because, arguably, it best explains the material identity of Christian truth over the course of time. In 
Sketch of a doctrine of special revelation
A comprehensive doctrine of God's special revelation should include the origin, content, manner, and purpose of God's special revelation. Pared down for my purpose here, I will concentrate on the content and manner of his revelation. What is, then, the content of revelation? Put differently, what is it that is revealed? In a fundamental sense, God reveals himself, and so we may say that the content of revelation is God's own proper reality, his own self, and the gift of himself "as a communion of persons inviting human persons to enter into communion." 35 In the words of Dei Verbum, "His will was that men should have access to the Father, through Christ, the Word made flesh, in the Holy Spirit, and thus become sharers in the divine nature (cf. Eph 2:18; 2 Pet 1:4). By this revelation, then, the invisible God (cf. Col 1:15; 1 Tim 1:17), from the fullness of his love, addresses men as his friends (cf. Ex 33:11; Jn 15:14-15), and moves among them (cf. Bar. 3:38), in order to invite and receive them into his own company." 36 Indeed, Dei Verbum discloses that the purpose of God's self-revelation is coming to know him.
Yet, there is also the manner or means of revelation to consider: God reveals himself in the economy of special revelation in his words and actions, and there is an inner unity between these two. As Edward Schillebeeckx pointedly states, "Christ himself, both in His actions and in His words, is revelation. 'Etiam factum Verbi verbum nobis est' [St. Augustine] -the acts of the word speak to us and, on the other hand, the revelation-inword is only one aspect of the total appearance of the mystery of Christ." 37 Similarly, Dei Verbum holds that the economy of special revelation consists of a pattern of deeds of God in history and words, of divine actions and divinely given interpretations of those actions, that are inextricably bound together in that revelation. God's redemptive revelation of himself is accomplished through historical events as well as through written words. Thus: "the works performed by God in the history of salvation show forth and bear out the doctrine and realities signified by the words; the words, for their part, proclaim the works, and bring to light the mystery they contain." In sum, revelation is intrinsically a word-and-deed revelation, and hence "propositions are not the whole of revelation, for God also enters into human history and acts in it." 38 Furthermore, God not only reveals himself, giving us himself in Trinitarian communion. Rather, at one and the same time, Holy Scripture is not only God's gift of himself, inviting humanity to share in his life, but also a disclosure of revealed truths that are determinative for faith. The idea that God's self-revelation is a word-revelation, although significantly true, forming an essential element of God's revelation, entails the idea of propositional revelation, of revealed truth, namely, that "propositions are part of the way God reveals himself." How so?
Given the claim that the verbal revelation of God's Word contains a realism in the sense that "it is to be believed and not contradicted," and also that "it is a true word, telling of things as in fact they are," as Lonergan puts it, 39 we can easily understand that this revelation presupposes an objective referent for the truth of the judgments made throughout this Word. Therefore, the truth-bearers of those objective realities, that is, a certain state of affairs that exist in reality, must be propositions, and not merely words. "Propositions express or describe possible realities, true propositions express actualities, what is the case. These propositions are expressed in words, but they are not just words." 40 In sum, then, following Grisez, I would say that linguistic expressions or conceptual formulations are not just formulations, just thoughts, or just words; they are what the words convey and the thoughts grasp of reality. The true propositions asserted in Scripture, then, are about objective realities.
Moreover, that assent to some definite propositions is essential to or determinative for faith is clear from the New Testament itself (see Acts 2:41; Rom 10:9-17; 1 Cor 15:1-8; 1 Tim 46; 2 Tim 3:14, 4:1-5, and many other places). Thus, pace Smit, Christian faith "includes assenting to the truth of propositions," expressed in creeds or confessions. 41 Grisez right notes that "One cannot give God the submission of faith without assenting to the truth he has revealed." Accordingly, it is a false dilemma to suggest, "Christian faith is believing in God rather than believing these propositional truths." "Since God reveals these propositional truths and believing them belongs to faith, to refuse to believe the truths of faith would be to refuse to believe God himself." 42 We may put this last point by stating that the Gospel, then, is also a teaching, meaning thereby "an instructive communicating of facts and events of salvation, or an instructive interpretation of the Holy Scripture of the Old Testament." 43 In this connection, Josef Rupert Geiselmann correctly states that the "New Testament itself calls the gospel a doctrine, didachē (Rom 16:17, Acts 2:42), didaschalia (Rom 12:7; pastoral letters, passim). To preach the word of God is also paraphrased with didaschein (2 Thes 2:15; Col 2:7; Eph 4:21; 1 Tim 4:11; Acts 5:42, 18:11, 28:31). The announcer of the word of God may also be honoured by the title of teacher (didaschalos) (1 Ti 2:7; 2 Ti 1:11)." 44 I turn to consider the question of continuity and discontinuity in the hermeneutics of creeds and confessions, in short, of ecclesial texts. What hermeneutical principle should guide our handling of ecclesial texts?
Hermeneutical principle for interpreting ecclesial texts
The brief answer to the concluding question of the last section is this: we should not make judgments about, say, the Councils of Trent and Vatican I without understanding the integral totality of Catholicism because the statements of these councils were polemical and antithetical. This observation is of course consistent with Smit's position that confessions are historical documents and all that this entails, as he described it, for the responsible interpreter. Characterizing these councils in this way provides openness to seeing that all truth formulated for polemical reasons is partial -albeit true. GC Berkouwer recognizes this point: "One-sidedness does not make the decision of 1870 [Vatican I on the primacy and infallibility of the pope] a false one, but it does have the marks of incompletion, of needing the complement of other facets of the episcopacy." 45 In explaining the hermeneutical principle operative here, Berkouwer draws on Hans Urs von Balthasar's understanding of this principle. 46 Balthasar explains, "Even though, of course, the truth of the Councils of Trent and Vatican I will never be overtaken or even relativized, nonetheless there are still other views and aspects of revelation than those expressed there. This has always happened throughout church history, when new statements are brought forth to complete earlier insights in order to do justice to the inexhaustible riches of divine revelation even in the earthen vessel of human language." 47 A corollary of this hermeneutical principle is the distinction between the truth and its formulations, between form and content, context and content. The import of this distinction is that it "implies that the Church's formulation of the truth could have, for various reasons, actually occasioned misunderstandings of the truth itself." 48 In other words, the formulation or expression itself of the truth could be characterized by one-sidedness, and hence the doctrinal formulations have not said everything that should be said.
Following Congar, we may distinguish two types of one-sidedness. "First, there is the possibility that this formulation, made in reaction to an error characterized by unilateralism, should itself become unilateral in its expression. Next, there is the possibility that the condemnation might include in its condemnation of the erroneous reactive element the seeds of truth as well, whose original ambivalence unfortunately became deviant." 49 An example of the first type of one-sidedness we may turn briefly to the beginning of Chapter 2 of the Constitutio dogmatica de fide catholica where, in opposition to fideism and rationalism, it is affirmed that man's reason has the natural ability to grasp with certainty truths about God in and through the things that were created. In other words, the emphasis here is on "the subjective, creaturely presupposition for perceiving it." Given this concern, it is understandable why, as Balthasar also remarks, "this [creation] revelation is not at all named or described as such." Still, he adds:
The passage from Paul (Rom 1:20) cited by the Council frequently speaks in this context -from which it cannot be disengaged -of an act of revelation. …Certainly it was not part of the intention of the Council to thematize this side of the problem. But the Acta [et decreta sacrorum Conciliorum recentiorum] speak nonetheless of an act of revelation by God. Catholic dogmatics recognizes this. …Thus we may say that the 'inferential' ascent of thought to the Creator [that is, natural theology] is always borne by the Creator's prior decision to reveal himself in this nature itself. 50 council to rule out this basis of the knowledge." 52 Nevertheless, Berkouwer adds, "It is certainly true that in Roman Catholic theology (here natural theology) God's revelation in nature does not function as such."
53 And yet, given the polemical and antithetical doctrinal pronouncements of Vatican I against fideism and rationalism, it is easy to see why, unfortunately, it is unilateral in its expression of the mind's truth attaining capacity.
Let us now consider, as an example of the second type of one-sidedness, Pius XI's negative attitude toward the ecumenical movement 54 because of its denial of the visible unity of the Church of Christ, appearing as "one body of faithful, agreeing in one and the same doctrine under one teaching authority and government." On the contrary, some in the ecumenical movement "understand a visible Church as nothing else than a Federation, composed of various communities of Christians, even though they adhere to different doctrines, which may even be incompatible one with another." 55 The pope rejected these views because they were based on an ecclesiological relativism, fostering a false irenicism and religious indifferentism. In light of Vatican II's Unitatis Redintegratio (1964) and John Paul II's Ut unum Sint (1995), however, we can say that Pius XI was right in rejecting these views as false, but incorrect in his analysis that the rejected errors where inherent to ecumenism, with the latter jeopardizing the dogma that the Catholic Church is in some fundamental sense the one visible Church of God.
The distinction, then, rightly understood, between truth and its formulations or expressions need not bring the truth of the Church's dogmas into uncertainty. Berkouwer understands the types of one-sidedness we have been briefly examining. He writes, "The Church has been constant in truth at its deepest intent, even though it [the Church] has not been elevated above historical relativity in its analysis of the rejected errors." 56 Significantly, Berkouwer correctly affirms in the italicized sentence of the above quotation that interpretations of previous dogmatic pronouncements may not be revisionist. He clearly defines what he means by the latter: "giving a new and different meaning to the dogma in order to make it acceptable to a new era." In this connection, I think we can justifiably hold that Berkouwer's point here is, arguably, based on the distinction between truth and its historically conditioned formulations, between form and content, propositions and sentences, which was invoked by John XXIII in his opening address at Vatican II, Gaudet Mater Ecclesia.
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The pope made this distinction between truth and its formulations in a famous statement at the beginning of Vatican II: 'The deposit or the truths of faith, contained in our sacred teaching, are one thing, while the mode in which they are enunciated, keeping the same meaning and the same judgment [eodem sensu eademque sententia], is another'. The subordinate clause 59 in this passage is part of a larger passage from Vatican Council I, Dei Filius (Denzinger 3020), and this passage is itself from the Commonitorium primum 23 of the fifth century monk, Vincent of Lérins (died c. 445): "Therefore, let there be growth and abundant progress in understanding, knowledge, and wisdom, in each and all, in individuals and in the whole Church, at all times and in the progress of ages, but only with the proper limits, i.e., within the same dogma, the same meaning, the same judgment." So, we can say with justification that John XXIII framed the question regarding the nature of doctrinal continuity in light of the Lérinian thesis, which was received by Vatican I, namely, that doctrine must progress according to the same meaning and the same judgment (eodem sensu eademque sententia), allowing for legitimate pluralism and authentic diversity within a fundamental unity.
Put differently, appreciating the ecumenical significance of the distinction between truth and its formulations, form and truth-content, does not sacrifice the immutability or permanence of dogmatic truth. It simply brings with it the 'immense advantage of dissipating prejudices and correcting false interpretations' presupposed in the Church's analysis of rejected errors. 60 Furthermore, mindful that the expression of the truth itself may be characterized by one-sidedness, that is, "incomplete or unbalanced formulations" -which is different from claiming that the Council "formally committed the Church to doctrinal error" 61 -we can easily understand Aidan Nichols point. He writes:
[T]he doctrinal statements of a Council (which, obviously, are far more important for the Church of all ages) may be less than balanced or comprehensive and thus, by implication, need supplemen-tation, whether from another Council or from other sources. The development of Christological doctrine in the early centuries, from Ephesus to the Third Council of Constantinople, substantiates, I believe, this view. Were the Church to have drawn a line under that development at any point before the last of the four Councils concerned, we should not have had the beautiful equilibrium of our doctrine of the Word incarnate, a pre-existing divine Person now energizing in his two natures, with his twofold divine and human will… We must not ask for perfection from Councils, even in their doctrinal aspect. It is enough to know that, read according to a hermeneutic of continuity they will not lead us astray. An Ecumenical Council will never formally commit the Church to doctrinal error. It is, moreover, unfair to ask of Councils what they have not claimed to provide.
Suppose we assume that the right way to analyse belief and judgment is into a content, on the one hand, and the stance of belief or the action of judgment, on the other hand. The context of the belief that 2+3=5, is that 2+3=5, and the content of the judgment that today is warm and sunny, is that today is warm and sunny. Let us further suppose that the content of beliefs and judgments are entities of some sort, so that believing something consists of taking up the stance of belief toward that entity which one believes, and judging something consists of performing the action of judging on that entity which one judges to be true. Frege called such entities Gedanken, that is, thoughts … Gedanken are not states of mind. He argues that whereas you and I can believe and assert the same Gedanke, we cannot share the same state of mind. Obviously Gedanken are also not physical entities. And neither, so Frege argued, are they to be identified with sentences, for the reason that two distinct sentences may express one and the same Gedanke. Gedanken have to be abstract entities -or as the hermeneutic tradition preferred to call them, ideal entities. What distinguishes them from such other abstract entities as properties is that they can be believed and asserted, and that they are all either true or false. 65 [The] capacity for being written down is based on the fact that speech itself shares in the pure ideality of the meaning that communicates itself in it. In writing, the meaning of what is spoken exists purely for itself, completely detached from all emotional elements of expression and communication. A text is not to be understood as an expression of life but with respect to what it says. Writing is the abstract ideality of language. Hence the meaning of something written is fundamentally identifiable and repeatable. What is identical in the repetition is only what was actually deposited in the written record. This indicates that "repetition" cannot be meant here in its strict sense. It does not mean referring back to the original source where something is said or written. The understanding of something written is not a repetition of something past but the sharing of a present meaning.
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The Fregean-Husserlian ontology of textual meaning then affirms the objectivity of meaning in general and is thus anti-historicist. I join Wolterstorff in siding "with Frege and Husserl that the right analysis of judgment is that, in judgment, there is something that one judges to be true that's to be distinguished from both that particular act and the sentence one uses to make the judgment."
68 What is more, thoughts, meanings, and propositions -what Wolterstorff elsewhere calls noematic content 69 -are true if and only if what they assert is in fact the case, being the way things are; otherwise, they are false. In short, regarding the status of meaning, the way things are, objective reality, is what makes "meanings" true or false. Furthermore, adds Wolterstorff, "readers of texts can often find out the noematic content of the discourse of which the text is the mediumso that, in that sense, noematic content is 'transferable' from one mind to another." 70 One could add here: propositions are transferable as well to different contexts and conceptualities in which we seek to understand and communicate truth, including divine truth.
This conclusion brings us back John XXIII's famous Lénerian statement: "the deposit or the truths of faith, contained in our sacred teaching, are one thing, while the mode in which they are enunciated, keeping the same meaning and the same judgment, is another." As I argued earlier, it seems obvious that John is distinguishing here between the propositional truths of faith and their linguistic expressions. This seems even more obvious in light of the point that the linguistic expressions of the truths of faith must keep the same meaning and the same judgment -if one grasps what a proposition means and judges that proposition to be true, one knows what it is asserting to be true about reality itself. The former are, if true, always and everywhere true; the latter, that is, the different way of expressing these truths, may vary in our attempts to more clearly and accurately communicate revealed truths, but do not affect the truth of the propositions. Thus, the distinction between propositions and linguistic expressions is necessary in order to show that the propositional truths of faith establish "the material continuity of the Christian faith from biblical times to our own day." 71 In sum, the position for which I have argued in this article can affirm a propositional view of truth and a corresponding propositional view of revelation while at the same time (a) accounting for the need for new theological formulations; (b) defend the notion that the material continuity of the Christian faith is possible because truth is unchangeable; and (c) that doctrine must progress according to the same meaning and the same judgment (eodem sensu eademque sententia), allowing for legitimate pluralism and authentic diversity within a fundamental dogmatic unity. , 71-81, takes a position on the question of continuity and discontinuity that is close to the one for which I argued in this article. He says, "Fidelity to orthodox judgment intrinsic to the particular meaning expressed in propositions is what counts, not the language itself " (74). Again, "The judgments endure but always need new cultural and therefore linguistic formulations" (75). And again, "A purely classicist understanding of language believes that a static unchanging, unchangeable, normative language is alone capable of expressing (semper idem) the community's ortho-dox beliefs" (75).
